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Abstract
The French ‘Code de procédure pénale’ provides the possi-
bility to revise final criminal convictions. The Act of 2014
reformed the procedure for revision and introduced some
important novelties. The first is that it reduced the different
possible grounds for revision to one ground, which it
intended to broaden. The remaining ground for revision is
the existence of a new fact or an element unknown to the
court at the time of the initial proceedings, of such a nature
as to establish the convicted person’s innocence or to give
rise to doubt about his guilt. The legislature intended judges
to no longer require ‘serious doubt’. However, experts ques-
tion whether judges will comply with this intention of the
legislature. The second is the introduction of the possibility
for the applicant to ask the public prosecutor to carry out
the investigative measures that seem necessary to bring to
light a new fact or an unknown element before filing a
request for revision. The third is that the Act of 2014 cre-
ated the ‘Cour de révision et de réexamen’, which is com-
posed of eighteen judges of the different chambers of the
‘Cour de cassation’. This ‘Cour de révision et de réexamen’
is divided into a ‘commission d’instruction’, which acts as a
filter and examines the admissibility of the requests for revi-
sion, and a ‘formation de jugement’, which decides on the
substance of the requests. Practice will have to show
whether these novelties indeed improved the accessibility of
the revision procedure.
Keywords: Final criminal conviction, revision procedure,
grounds for revision, preparatory investigative measures,
Cour de révision et de réexamen
1 Introduction
Like many states, France has been confronted with
notorious cases in which the wrong person was convic-
ted. The best known example is probably the case of
Alfred Dreyfus, an officer who was wrongly convicted
for treason and banned to Devil’s Island. This convic-
tion incited Émile Zola to publish his famous letter
‘J’accuse’ in the newspaper L’Aurore in 1898. In this let-
ter, he accused many high-ranking officials of manipu-
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lating the investigation and of trying to cover it up.
Eventually, a new investigation was conducted and
exposed the malpractices. After many years, Dreyfus
was exonerated.
This and other cases demonstrate the importance of
providing a possibility to re-examine final criminal con-
victions if there are strong indications that the convic-
tion is erroneous. The French ‘Code de procédure
pénale’ (Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter: CPP)
provides for such a possibility in Article 622 et seq.1 The
procedure was fundamentally reformed in 2014, after
the finding that the previous reform of 1989 had not
achieved all its objectives, because few requests for revi-
sion were successful and had led to a new decision on
the merits.2 Both in the ‘Assemblée nationale’ and in the
‘Sénat’, there was broad support for the reform in 2014,
resulting in the unanimous adoption of the (amended)
legislative proposal.3 Among other things, Act no
2014-640 of 20 June 20144 changed the grounds on
which a request for revision could be based and defined
more clearly the tasks of the different bodies considering
the request (see infra).
At the same time, a proposal to provide the possibility to
revise a final acquittal was on the table,5 after new DNA
evidence had turned up in a highly publicised murder
case, creating a strong suspicion among the public that
1. There is a separate revision procedure for convictions for offending
public decency by means of a book (Loi n° 46-2064 du 25 septembre
1946 ouvrant un recours en révision contre les condamnations pronon-
cées pour outrages aux bonnes mœurs commis par la voie du livre). This
specific revision procedure will not be discussed in this article.
2. Rapport d’information n° 1598 enregistré le 4 décembre 2013 sur la
révision des condamnations pénales par MM. Alain Tourret et Georges
Fenech, Assemblée nationale 2013-14, XIVe législature, at 15 (herein-
after: Rapport d’information n° 1598); Compte rendu intégral de la pre-
mière séance du 27 février 2014, Assemblée nationale 2013-14, XIVe
législature, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cri/2013-2014/20140184
.asp#P208536 (hereinafter: Assemblée nationale 27 février 2014); F.
Fournié, ‘Réviser la révision’, 27 La Semaine Juridique 1326, at 1326
(2014) (hereinafter: Fournié); C. Ribeyre, ‘La réforme des procédures de
révision et de réexamen ou comment mieux corriger l’erreur judiciaire’,
10 Droit pénal étude 17, at n. 1 (2014) (hereinafter: Ribeyre).
3. Assemblée nationale 27 février 2014, above n. 2; Compte rendu inté-
gral de la deuxième séance du 11 juin 2014, Assemblée nationale
2013-14, XIVe législature, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cri/
2013-2014/20140231.asp#P248399; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 1.
4. Loi n° 2014-640 du 20 juin 2014 relative à la réforme des procédures
de révision et de réexamen d’une condamnation pénale définitive.
5. In the form of an amendment to the legislative proposal that served as
basis for the Act of 2014. Amendement n° 5 de 24 février 2014,




ELR 2020 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000176
the final acquittal of the main suspect was erroneous.6
However, this proposal for a revision in defavorem7 was
not accepted.8
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it wishes to
describe the revision procedure as it is in the books.
Second, it intends to look at some aspects of the revision
procedure in action. We will therefore first provide an
overview of the legal framework of the revision proce-
dure, highlighting some of the novelties introduced by
the Act of 2014. We will then look at the revision proce-
dure in practice, to answer the question whether,
according to the initial findings, the reform of 2014 lives
up to the expectations raised by the legislature.
2 Legal Framework of the
Revision Procedure
2.1 The Start of the Revision Procedure
2.1.1 Possible Applicants
In France, there are three categories of criminal
offences. The first category, consisting of the most seri-
ous offences, is called ‘crime’ (felony, crime). The sec-
ond is called ‘délit’ (ordinary offence, misdemeanour),
and the third, comprising the least serious offences, is
called ‘contravention’ (contravention) (Art. 111-1 Code
pénal). Not all criminal decisions are eligible for revi-
sion. Only decisions in which someone is found guilty of
one (or both) of the two more serious categories of
offences (‘crime’ or ‘délit’) can be revised (Art. 622
CPP).9 A simple finding of guilt is sufficient, so the
imposition of a penalty is not required.10 Moreover, the
6. Amendement n° 5, above n. 5; Assemblée nationale 27 février 2014,
above n. 2 (intervention of Mr Georges Fenech); L. Colcombet, ‘Meur-
tre de Nelly Haderer: le dernier espoir de connaître la vérité’, Le Parisien
(6 December 2017), www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/meurtre-de-nelly-
haderer-le-dernier-espoir-de-connaitre-la-
verite-06-12-2017-7437354.php; M. Gay, ‘Affaire Haderer: La vérité
judiciaire à l’épreuve de la science’, Info du Jour (13 October 2017)
infodujour.fr/societe/justice/10193-affaire-haderer-la-verite-judiciaire-
a-lepreuve-de-la-science.
7. However, Art. 6 para. 2 CPP already allows in an exceptional circum-
stance criminal proceedings to resume after they were discontinued
owing to, for example, the death of the defendant, prescription or
amnesty: when the falsity of that decision on the discontinuance of the
proceedings has been established. An example given in this context is
that of a defendant pretending to be deceased to escape criminal prose-
cution (D. Caron, ‘Art. 6 – Fasc. 10: Action publique – Extinction –
Décès, amnistie et autres causes’, in X., JurisClasseur Procédure pénale
(2020) loose-leaf, at n. 72).
8. E. Daures, ‘Révision’, in M. Aydalot (ed.), Répertoire de droit pénal et
de procédure pénale (2015) loose-leaf, at n. 11 (hereinafter: Daures); S.
Guinchard and J. Buisson, Procédure pénale (2018), at 1352 (herein-
after: Guinchard and Buisson).
9. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 20-21; F. Desportes and
L. Lazerges-Cousquer, Traité de Procédure Pénale (2016), at
2308-2309 (hereinafter: Desportes a.o.); Fournié, above n. 2, at 1327;
Guinchard and Buisson, above n. 8, at 1353-1354; Ribeyre, above n. 2,
at n. 2; F. Saint-Pierre, Pratique de défense pénale. Droit, histoire,
stratégie (2018), at 660 (hereinafter: Saint-Pierre).
10. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 20-21; C. Ambroise-Cas-
térot, J.-F. Renucci, J.-P. Céré & M. Léna, Code de Procédure Pénale
Annoté (2018), at 983 (hereinafter: Ambroise-Castérot a.o.); Daures,
revision procedure concerns only criminal decisions that
are final.11 No other remedies may be available to chal-
lenge the criminal decision. Either the ordinary rem-
edies have been exhausted or the term in which they can
be exercised has expired.12
The convicted person can file a request for revision. In
the event of incapacity, his legal representative can file
the request for him. When the convicted person is
deceased or declared missing, a request for revision can
be filed by his spouse, partner in a civil union, cohabit-
ee, parents, children, grand- or great-grandchildren, his
universal legatee or part universal legatee (Art. 622-2
CPP).
The possibility for revision does not only serve the pri-
vate interests of the convicted person. Correcting
wrongful convictions is also in the public interest, as it
restores people’s confidence in the justice system.13
Therefore, revision can also be requested by the
Minister for Justice, the attorney general at the ‘Cour de
cassation’ (Supreme Court) and the attorneys general at
the courts of appeal (Art. 622-2 CPP).
2.1.2 The Grounds for Revision
2.1.2.1 New Fact or Unknown Element Establishing
Innocence or Giving Rise to Doubt
Since the Act of 2014, there is only one ground for revi-
sion left, unlike before, when there were four grounds
(former Art. 622 CPP):
1. after a conviction for homicide, sufficient indications
are presented that the alleged victim is still alive;
2. after a conviction, there is a new conviction finding
another defendant guilty of the same fact, both con-
victions being irreconcilable, so that one of the con-
victed persons has to be innocent;
3. after a conviction, a witness that was heard is convic-
ted for false testimony concerning the defendant;
4. after a conviction, a new fact or an element unknown
to the court at the time of the proceedings comes to
the surface and is of such a nature as to cast doubt on
the convicted person’s guilt.
When preparing the Act of 2014, the legislature decided
that the first three grounds were already included in the
fourth ground, and that there was therefore no need to
maintain the first three.14 Since the Act of 2014, the
above n. 8, at n. 11 and 15; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 2; Saint-Pierre,
above n. 9, at 660.
11. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 19-22; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2308;
Fournié, above n. 2, at 1327; Guinchard and Buisson, above n. 8, at
1353; Saint-Pierre, above n. 9, at 660.
12. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 20; Daures, above n. 8,
at n. 20.
Example of a case in which the term for exercising the ordinary rem-
edies had not expired because it had not started yet: CRR 18 June
2015, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2015:C1E1043.
13. Assemblée nationale 27 février 2014, above n. 2; Fournié, above n. 2,
at 1328.
14. Rapport n° 467 enregistré le 16 avril 2014 sur la proposition de loi,
adoptée par l’Assemblée nationale, relative à la réforme des procédures
de révision et de réexamen d’une condamnation pénale définitive par
M. Nicolas Alfonsi, Sénat 2013-14, at 5, 21 and 40 (hereinafter: Rap-
port n° 467); Compte rendu intégral des débats de la séance du 29 avril
23
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only ground15 for revision is therefore the existence of a
new fact or an element unknown to the court at the time
of the initial proceedings, of such a nature as to establish
the convicted person’s innocence or to give rise to doubt
about his guilt (Art. 622 CPP).16 The newly presented
element may not have been known by the court at the
time of the initial proceedings. By contrast, it is no
obstacle to revision if the convicted person already knew
about the element.17
Not only did the legislature want to simplify the
grounds for revision, but it also wanted to make the
revision procedure more accessible on a substantive lev-
el. It therefore intended the scope of the remaining
ground for revision to be broader. The ‘Assemblée
nationale’ found that judges tended to interpret the for-
mer fourth ground for revision strictly. Although it was
not stated as such in former Article 622 CPP, they gave
a very narrow interpretation to the wording ‘doubt’,
reading it as if ‘serious doubt’18 was required.19
The case law requiring serious doubt dates back to
before the reform of 1989, when the legal provision
spoke of facts or unknown pieces of such a nature as to
establish the convicted person’s innocence. It did not
contain a reference to doubt. By stating that ‘serious
doubt’ was sufficient, judges, in fact, mitigated the strict
wording of the provision from before 1989.20 However,
in 1989, the legislature introduced in Article 622 CPP
2014, Sénat 2013-14, www.senat.fr/seances/s201404/s20140429/
s20140429_mono.html#Niv1_SOM7 (intervention of Mr Nicolas Alfon-
si) (hereinafter: Sénat 29 avril 2014); Daures, above n. 8, at n. 24;
Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2310; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1327.
15. The rapport d’information n° 4302 of 2016 that evaluates the Act of
2014 proposes to add another ground for revision: the existence of a
fundamental procedural irregularity affecting the reliability of evidence,
for example confessions obtained by torture (Rapport d’information n°
4302 enregistré le 14 décembre 2016 sur l’évaluation de la loi n°
2014-640 du 20 juin 2014 relative à la réforme des procédures de révi-
sion et de réexamen d’une condamnation pénale définitive par MM.
Georges Fenech et Alain Tourret, Assemblée nationale 2016, XIVe lég-
islature, at 18 and 33 (hereinafter: Rapport d’information n° 4302)).
That proposal has not been implemented in the CPP thus far. A case
that demonstrated the possible need for this ground for revision is CRR
(Commission d’instruction) 16 March 2015, 13REV037.
16. Art. 622 CPP: ‘La révision d’une décision pénale définitive peut être
demandée au bénéfice de toute personne reconnue coupable d’un
crime ou d’un délit lorsque, après une condamnation, vient à se pro-
duire un fait nouveau ou à se révéler un élément inconnu de la juridic-
tion au jour du procès de nature à établir l’innocence du condamné ou à
faire naître un doute sur sa culpabilité.’
17. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 26; H. Angevin and M.
Lafourcade, ‘Art. 622 à 626-1 – Fasc. 20: Demandes en révision’, in
LexisNexis (ed.), JurisClasseur Procédure pénale (2018) loose-leaf, at n.
56 (hereinafter: Angevin a.o.).
18. In some cases the wording ‘reasonable doubt’ is used. However, the
rapporteurs appointed by the ‘Assemblée nationale’ find that this ‘rea-
sonable doubt’ in fact amounts to ‘serious doubt’ (Rapport d’informa-
tion n° 1598, above n. 2, at 27-28).
19. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 25-34; Proposition de loi
n° 1700 relative à la réforme des procédures de révision et de réexamen
d’une condamnation pénale définitive, Assemblée nationale 2013-14,
XIVe législature, at 5 (hereinafter: Proposition de loi n° 1700); Assem-
blée nationale 27 février 2014, above n. 2; D. Goetz, ‘La révision en
matière pénale’, Doctoral thesis at the Université de Strasbourg (2015),
www.theses.fr/2015STRAA036, at 101-102 and 234 (hereinafter:
Goetz).
20. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 24; Goetz, above n. 19,
at 95.
the concept of doubt and deliberately did not qualify it.
According to the ‘Assemblée nationale’, the legislature
thus wanted to ensure that, in principle, the slightest
doubt21 could be sufficient to obtain a new examination
of the merits of the case.22 By still requiring serious
doubt, judges did not comply with this intention of the
legislature. Moreover, according to several experts, in
some cases the requirement of serious doubt in fact
required the applicant to establish his innocence by
pointing out the real culprit or to establish that it was
practically or legally impossible for him to commit the
crime.23 ‘Simple’ doubt, on the contrary, was not
deemed sufficient to allow revision.24
The ‘Assemblée nationale’ criticised this case law for
being too strict. It considered that, as is the case in the
original procedure for the accused, doubt should benefit
the convicted person and lead to a new examination of
the merits of the case.25 It thus wanted to urge judges to
alter their case law by rephrasing the ground for revi-
sion. In order to make clear that, in principle, doubt in
itself is sufficient for a request to be successful, it pro-
posed to use the wording ‘le moindre doute’ (the slight-
est doubt) in the Act of 2014.
The ‘Sénat’, however, disagreed with this proposal for
several reasons. First, the introduction of the concept
‘serious doubt’ was actually intended to allow judges to
be more flexible at a time (before the reform in 1989)
when the legal provision allowed revision only when the
judge was convinced of the convicted person’s inno-
cence.26 Second, judges’ interpretation of the question
of doubt varied according to whether or not it was possi-
ble to organise adversarial hearings, being more flexible
when such hearings were still possible and more strict
when the ‘Cour de révision’ decided in the last instance
and could not refer the case.27 Third, it was raised that
it is artificial to qualify doubt; either there is doubt, or
there is no doubt, but there are no levels in between.
Adding the word ‘moindre’ (slightest) had no legal
meaning and thus no added value.28 Not qualifying the
level of doubt leaves it to the judges to appreciate
whether or not the new fact or unknown element calls
into question the reasoning adopted in the original con-
viction and thus raises doubt.29
In order not to delay the adoption of the legislative
proposal for the Act of 2014, the ‘Assemblée nationale’
21. Others argue that ‘doubt’ in the sense of former Art. 622 CPP requires
a certain intensity and does not include all types of doubt. According to
them, it concerns ‘insurmountable and rational doubt’, which corre-
sponds with doubt that benefits the accused in the original procedure
(in dubio pro reo). What counts is whether in a specific case doubt is
rational, regardless of whether it is phrased as ‘simple’ or ‘serious’ doubt
(Goetz, above n. 19, at 99-100).
22. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 24 and 98.
23. Ibid., at 28-30 and 98-99; Goetz, above n. 19, at 101-2.
24. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 30-3 and 99.
25. Ibid., at 34; Goetz, above n. 19, at 97-8.
26. Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 21 and 40.
27. Ibid., at 21 and 41.
28. Ibid.; Sénat 29 avril 2014, above n. 14; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1327;
Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 3.
29. Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 21; Sénat 29 avril 2014, above n. 14
(intervention of Mr Nicolas Alfonsi).
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agreed to leave out the word ‘moindre’ in the text that
was finally adopted. However, both in the parliamentary
report and during the parliamentary debate, the ‘Assem-
blée nationale’ stressed its intention to urge judges to
relax their interpretation and to no longer require ‘seri-
ous doubt’.30 It expressed its confidence in the members
of the newly composed ‘Cour de révision et de réex-
amen’ not to interpret the provision contrary to the
intention of the legislature.31
Whether a fact or an element can be successfully
invoked in a request for revision thus depends a lot on
the facts of the case. A confession of the actual perpetra-
tor, a new declaration of the victim or a witness, new
DNA evidence … can be considered a new fact or an
unknown element32 but will lead to a revision only if
they cast doubt on the applicant’s guilt.33 Sometimes
that is quite clear, for example elements proving the
hospitalisation of the convicted person at the time of the
offence in a hospital that was far removed from the
crime scene, or elements proving that the convicted per-
son was completely paralysed at the time of the
offence.34 Sometimes, however, the question of doubt is
less clear. For example, new testimonies of accomplices
clearing the applicant can be considered a new fact, but
if they are contradictory and implausible, they might
not cast doubt on the applicant’s guilt and therefore not
lead to a revision.35
2.1.2.2 Conviction by the European Court of Human
Rights
In order to further simplify the procedure, the legisla-
ture decided to join together before the same court the
revision procedure and the procedure of reopening a
criminal conviction after the finding of a violation of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the European
Court of Human Rights (Art. 622-1 CPP). Both proce-
dures are alike in the sense that they can both lead to a
new assessment of a case after a criminal conviction had
already become final.36 Yet, as the French legislature
also acknowledges, they are also different: the revision
30. Rapport n° 1957 enregistré le 21 mai 2014 sur la proposition de loi (n°
1900), modifiée par le Sénat, relative à la réforme des procédures de
révision et de réexamen d’une condamnation pénale définitive par M.
Alain Tourret, Assemblée nationale 2013-14, XIVe législature, at 19-20
and 27-8 (hereinafter: Rapport n° 1957); Fournié, above n. 2, at 1327;
Goetz, above n. 19, at 234.
31. Rapport n° 1957, above n. 30, at 19-20 and 27-8.
32. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 25; Ambroise-Castérot
a.o., above n. 10, at 985-87; Daures, above n. 8, at n. 28, 33, 37, 42,
46 and 49-51; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2311-2312.
33. For example CRR 25 October 2018, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2018:C1E1087, in
which the new testimonies cast doubt on the convicted person’s guilt.
An example of a case in which the revocation by the victim of its initial
allegations was not sufficient to cast doubt on the convicted person’s
guilt is CRR 18 June 2015, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2015:C1EV144.
34. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 25; Ambroise-Castérot
a.o., above n. 10, at 985; Daures, above n. 8, at n. 27 and 29;
Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2312.
35. Ambroise-Castérot a.o., above n. 10, at 987; Daures, above n. 8, at n.
52.
36. Proposition de loi n° 1700, above n. 19, at 4; Desportes a.o., above n.
9, at 2322; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1326.
procedure concerns factual errors and the reopening
procedure legal, procedural errors.37 For this reason, the
possibility to reopen a case after a conviction by the
European Court of Human Rights will not be dealt with
in this article.
2.1.3 The Possibility to Seek Investigative Measures
Before filing a request for revision, the applicant38 has
the possibility to ask the public prosecutor to carry out
the investigative measures that seem necessary to bring
to light a new fact or an element that was unknown at
the time of the initial proceedings (Art. 626 CPP).39 To
this end, he has to file a written and motivated request,
in which he clearly indicates the investigative measures
he wishes to see performed and, in case of a hearing,
clarifies the identity of the person he wishes to be heard.
The public prosecutor has to render a motivated deci-
sion on the request within two months from its recep-
tion. If he rejects the request, the applicant can appeal
to the attorney general, who has to decide within a
month.
This provision, introducing the possibility for the appli-
cant to seek investigative measures before filing a
request for revision, aims to make the revision proce-
dure more accessible on a procedural level.40 Convicted
persons with inadequate resources to take on a lawyer
and to carry out a private investigation or convicted per-
sons who are not supported by the media do not need to
wait for a new fact or an unknown element to pop up
but can instigate an investigation into the existence of
such a fact or element.41 This should also prevent alle-
gations of manipulation of evidence by the applicant or
his lawyer.42 An example given in this context is that of
a lawyer meeting with a possible new witness, after
which the testimony of the witness can be discredited by
allegations of corruption.43 Moreover, by establishing
before a request for revision is filed that there is little
indication for the existence of a new fact or an unknown
element, this provision also aims to discourage requests
for revision that have no prospect of success.44
2.2 Examination of the Request
2.2.1 Cour de révision et de réexamen
The applicant has to file a request for revision at the
‘Cour de révision et de réexamen’ (Court for revision
and reopening, hereinafter: CRR) (Art. 623 CPP). This
37. Assemblée nationale 27 février 2014, above n. 2; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 20; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2322; Fournié, above
n. 2, at 1326; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 6.
38. The convicted person or, in case of incapacity, his legal representative.
If the convicted person is deceased or declared missing, his spouse,
partner in a civil union, cohabitee, parents, children, grand- or great-
grandchildren, his universal legatee or part universal legatee can request
investigative measures before filing a request for revision (Art. 626
CPP).
39. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 74-75; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1329; Guin-
chard and Buisson, above n. 8, at 1354; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 4.
40. Assemblée nationale 27 février 2014, above n. 2.
41. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 86.
42. Ibid., at 87; Saint-Pierre, above n. 9, at 666.
43. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 87.
44. Ibid.
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court is composed of eighteen judges of the ‘Cour de
cassation’, including the president of the criminal cham-
ber, who presides over the CRR. The other members
are representatives of the different chambers of the
‘Cour de cassation’45 and are appointed by its general
assembly for three years, one time renewable.46 Eight-
een supplementary members are also appointed. Before
the CRR, the attorney general’s office at the ‘Cour de
cassation’ acts as prosecution service (Art. 623-1 CPP).47
To ensure the impartiality of the CRR, judges and
attorneys general that had been involved in the initial
investigation or the initial decision(s) on the merits of
the case that is now brought before the CRR have to
abstain from the examination of the request for revi-
sion.48 They may sit on neither division of the CRR nor
act as member of the attorney general’s office in this
case (Art. 623-1 CPP).
The CRR is divided in a ‘commission d’instruction’
(investigating commission) and a ‘formation de juge-
ment’ (adjudicating formation) (Art. 623-1 CPP). The
former is composed of five members of the CRR and
serves as a filter, by examining the admissibility of the
requests (see infra). The latter consists of the remaining
thirteen members and decides on the substance of the
requests for revision (see infra).
The composition of the CRR is one of the novelties of
the Act of 2014. Before this Act, requests were filtered
by a ‘commission de révision’, which was composed of
five judges of the ‘Cour de cassation’ and was not part of
the ‘Cour de révision’.49 The latter, the ‘Cour de révi-
sion’, consisted solely of members of the criminal cham-
ber of the ‘Cour de cassation’, and the number of judges
examining requests was undetermined and varied from
case to case.50 Also, the division of tasks between the
two bodies and their different roles were not very clearly
defined.51 This created an appearance of arbitrariness
and prejudice.52 To avoid these negative appearances,
the legislature in the Act of 2014 laid down the compo-
sition of the new CRR and made sure all chambers of
the ‘Cour de cassation’ are represented herein, to ensure
more diverse perspectives on and a more neutral appre-
ciation of the requests for revision.53 It also delineated
45. The criminal chamber; the first, second and third civil chambers; the
commercial, financial and economic chamber and the social chamber
(Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 31).
46. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 77; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2313; Four-
nié, above n. 2, at 1328; Guinchard and Buisson, above n. 8, at 129;
Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 9.
47. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 80; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1328; Guinchard
and Buisson, above n. 8, at 182.
48. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 81; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2314; Four-
nié, above n. 2, at 1328; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 9.
49. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 35; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 29.
50. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 40; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 30.
51. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 38-9; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 32.
52. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 40; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 30.
53. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 62-6; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 20 and 30-1; Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n.
15, at 9; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1328.
more clearly the tasks of the ‘commission d’instruction’
and the ‘formation de jugement’.54
By involving only members of the judicial branch in the
examination of (the admissibility of) a request for revi-
sion, the French legislature made a choice different
from that of some of its surrounding states, such as Bel-
gium and the Netherlands. Those states deemed it nec-
essary to involve non-judges in the revision procedure
(in an advisory role at the least) to avoid an appearance
of prejudice (judges deciding on alleged errors of other
judges) and to ensure that other, more scientific and
technical expertise is available when assessing the exist-
ence of a new or unknown element. The French legisla-
ture, in contrast, decided to counter an appearance of
prejudice by including judges working in different fields
of law, not merely penalists, but did not include non-
legal experts. The revision of a final criminal conviction
harms legal certainty and the authority of res iudicata
and should therefore be exceptional. For that reason,
the French legislature deemed members of the most
supreme court, the ‘Cour de cassation’, best placed to
decide on requests for revision.55 However, both the
‘commission d’instruction’ and the ‘formation de juge-
ment’ have investigative powers, so they can appoint an
expert when technical or scientific expertise is needed
(see infra).
2.2.2 Commission d’instruction
Five members of the CRR are appointed for three years
(one time renewable) to form the ‘commission d’instruc-
tion’, an investigating commission that filters the
requests for revision by dismissing the ones that are
inadmissible (Arts. 623-1 and 624 CPP). The president
of the commission can dismiss requests that are mani-
festly inadmissible without further ado in a motivated
decision.56 If the request does not appear inadmissible at
first sight, the commission proceeds with the exam-
ination of the request and can carry out investigative
measures. After having received the (written or oral)
comments of the applicant and his lawyer, the attorney
general and, if he intervened, the civil party or his law-
yer and after having given the applicant and his lawyer
the last word, the commission decides on the admissibil-
ity in a motivated decision. If it deems the request
admissible, it refers the case to the ‘formation de juge-
ment’. There is no appeal possible against the decisions
of the commission and its president on the request for
revision (Art. 624 CPP).
When the applicant invokes a new fact or an unknown
element, the commission has to verify whether it indeed
exists and is new or was previously unknown to the
court.57 According to the ‘Sénat’ and the commission
54. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 67-70; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 32-6; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1328-1329.
55. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 62.
56. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 86; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2314; Four-
nié, above n. 2, at 1329; Guinchard and Buisson, above n. 8, at 1355;
Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 9; Saint-Pierre, above n. 9, at 664.
57. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 68-9; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 15; Daures, above n. 8, at n. 90; Fournié, above n. 2, at
1329.
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itself, this also requires it to assess whether the fact or
element is linked to the case at hand and to the question
of guilt.58 The commission may not, however, assess the
impact of the invoked fact or element on the convicted
person’s guilt, since that would go beyond its task as a
filter.59 The latter assessment is for the ‘formation de
jugement’ to carry out. When performing its task as a
filter, the commission may also involve in the assess-
ment facts and elements that were invoked in previous
requests for revision.60
To fulfil its task, the commission has the same investig-
ative powers as an investigating judge.61 It can, for
example, hear witnesses, appoint an expert, organise a
reconstruction and seize assets.62 It cannot, however,
when there are strong indications that a third person is
the actual perpetrator, hear this person and take him
into custody (Art. 624 CPP).63 If such suspicions
towards a third person exist, the commission has to
inform the public prosecutor’s office, which will con-
duct the necessary investigations (Art. 624-2 CPP). The
applicant64 can ask the commission to carry out investig-
ative measures by a written and motivated request (Art.
624-5 CPP).65 The commission has to decide on this
request within three months from its reception. There is
no appeal possible against this decision of the commis-
sion.
Not only for the examination of the admissibility of the
request, but also to enable revision in general, it is nec-
essary that evidence is stored long enough.66 In France,
evidence can, in general,67 be destroyed six months after
the conviction (Art. 41-4 CPP).68 This proved to be an
impediment to the revision of criminal convictions. For
that reason, the Act of 2014 introduces the obligation for
the public prosecutor and the attorney general who
intend to destroy confiscated goods or to transfer them
58. Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 33-4; Rapport d’information n° 4302,
above n. 15, at 10.
59. Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 33; Rapport d’information n° 4302,
above n. 15, at 10; Daures, above n. 8, at n. 90.
60. Angevin a.o., above n. 17, at 148 and 151.
61. Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 16.
62. Ibid., at 22 and 34. As it did, for example, in CRR 25 October 2018,
ECLI:FR:CCASS:2018:C1E1087.
63. Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 22 and 34-5; Daures, above n. 8, at n.
90; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2314-2315; Fournié, above n. 2, at
1329.
64. Art. 624-4 CPP states that during the procedure, the applicant is repre-
sented by a lawyer. According to the CRR, this implies that the request
for investigative measures on the basis of Art. 624-5 CPP has to be filed
by the applicant’s lawyer. If not, it is inadmissible. CRR 24 November
2014, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2014:C1EV155.
65. Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 16; Daures, above n. 8, at n. 90;
Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2314; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1329; Guin-
chard and Buisson, above n. 8, at 1356; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 9.
66. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 81-6; S. Cormier, ‘Le
procès en révision avec la loi du 20 juin 2014’, 9 Cahiers Droit, Sciences
& Technologies 65, at n. 29 (2019) (hereinafter: Cormier); J. Danet, ‘De
la rumeur à la révision ou les leçons de l’erreur’, RSC 601 (2013).
67. There are exceptions, for example five years for the recordings of a
hearing of a minor that was the victim of one of the listed offences (Art.
706-52 CPP) and forty years for evidence on which an unknown DNA
profile was found (Art. R.53-20 jo. Art. R.53-10 CPP). (Rapport d’infor-
mation n° 1598, above n. 2, at 84.)
68. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 83-5; Rapport n° 467,
above n. 14, at 18 and 25-7.
to the agency responsible for the administration of
seized and confiscated assets to first give notice to the
convicted person (Art. 41-6 CPP).69 The convicted per-
son then has two months to oppose this decision. If the
public prosecutor or attorney general still wants to pro-
ceed with the destruction or transfer, the matter can be
brought before the ‘chambre d’instruction’ (indictments
chamber),70 who decides within a month. Every five
years, the public prosecutor or attorney general can
reassess the need for a transfer or destruction. If he
thinks them advisable, he will again have to notify the
convicted person, in accordance with Article 41-6
CPP.71 To limit the extra costs of the storage, this pro-
vision only applies to evidence in criminal cases, in
which there is a final conviction rendered by a ‘cour
d’assises’72.73
2.2.3 Formation de jugement
The thirteen remaining members of the CRR form the
‘formation de jugement’, which is presided over by the
president of the criminal chamber of the ‘Cour de cassa-
tion’ (Art. 623-1 CPP). The formation examines the
substance of the request and decides whether or not to
allow a revision. To ensure impartiality, the legislature
wanted to maintain a strict separation between the func-
tion of investigating a request and that of judging one. It
therefore assigned the latter function to the ‘formation
de jugement’ and stipulated that members of the ‘com-
mission d’instruction’ may not be part of the forma-
tion.74
The formation examines the substance of the request
and holds a public hearing during which it receives the
(written or oral) comments of the applicant and his law-
yer, the attorney general and, if he intervened, the civil
party or his lawyer (Art. 624-3 CPP). The president of
the formation can also decide to hear every person that
can contribute to the examination of the request. The
applicant or his lawyer is the last to speak before closing
the hearing.75
If the formation, however, finds that the case is not
ready to be heard yet, it can, before organising the hear-
ing, order an additional investigation.76 That investiga-
tion is to be executed by one or more of its members,
either directly or by rogatory commission. The forma-
tion has the same investigative powers as the ‘commis-
sion d’instruction’ (Art. 624-3 CPP) (see supra).
69. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 85-6; Daures, above n.
8, at n. 68; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1328; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 8.
70. Or, since 2019, before its president (Art. 41-6 CPP).
71. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 86; Fournié, above n. 2,
at 1328.
72. A court that judges the most serious offences and is characterised by
the involvement of a lay jury and the oral character of its proceedings
(Art. 240 CPP).
73. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 85-6.
74. Ibid., at 67; Rapport n° 467, above n. 14, at 31; Daures, above n. 8, at
n. 78; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1328; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 9.
75. Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2316; Guinchard and Buisson, above n. 8,
at 1357.
76. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 92; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2316; Four-
nié, above n. 2, at 1329; Guinchard and Buisson, above n. 8, at 1357.
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After the hearing, the formation renders a motivated77
decision on the request for revision.78 There is no
appeal possible against this decision (Art. 624-3 CPP).
The formation can decide that the request is unfounded
and dismiss it. If it decides that the request is founded,
it nullifies the original conviction (Art. 624-7 CPP). If it
is still possible to organise adversarial hearings, the for-
mation transfers the case to a court of the same order
and degree as the one that rendered the nullified convic-
tion but that is not that particular court (Art. 624-7
CPP). The assigned court will deliver a new decision on
the merits of the case but cannot impose a more severe
penalty than the initial one.79 If, however, after the nul-
lification it is clear that there is nothing left that can be
classified as an offence, the formation does not transfer
the case (Art. 624-7 CPP).80
Sometimes it is no longer possible to hold adversarial
hearings, owing, for instance, to the death of the convic-
ted person or the prescription of the criminal proceed-
ings.81 Then the formation does not transfer the case to
another court either and delivers a new decision on the
merits of the case itself (Art. 624-7 CPP).82
3 Practice and Challenges
Concerning the Revision
Procedure
3.1 First Evaluations of the Act of 2014
The Act of 2014 aimed to make the revision procedure
more accessible, both on a substantive and on a proce-
dural level: on a substantive level by changing the word-
ing of the ground for revision in an attempt to broaden
its scope and on a procedural level by expanding the list
of possible applicants, by giving applicants the possibili-
ty to ask for investigative measures before filing a
request for revision, by delineating more clearly the task
77. In the rapport d’information n° 4302, it is raised that, although in prac-
tice all decisions of the CRR rendered since the Act of 2014 were moti-
vated, Art. 624-7 CPP does not contain a formal obligation for the CRR
to motivate its decisions, whether it finds the request founded or
unfounded. Since adding a motivation serves the rights of the applicant,
the report thus proposes to introduce a provision in Art. 624-7 CPP
containing a clear obligation for the CRR to motivate its decisions (Rap-
port d’information n° 4302, above n. 15, at 12). Yet Art. 624-3 CPP
states the following: ‘(…) Lorsque l’affaire est en état, la formation de
jugement de la cour l’examine au fond et statue, par un arrêt motivé
non susceptible de recours, à l’issue d’une audience publique (…)’
(emphasis added). The CPP thus already contains an obligation for the
CRR to motivate its decisions.
78. Angevin a.o., above n. 17, at 166; Daures, above n. 8, at n. 93;
Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at 2316; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1329; Guin-
chard and Buisson, above n. 8, at 1357; Ribeyre, above n. 2, at n. 10.
79. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 103; Guinchard and Buisson, above n. 8, at
1357.
80. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 111-112; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at
2316-2317.
81. Daures, above n. 8, at n. 105; Desportes a.o., above n. 9, at
2316-2317; Fournié, above n. 2, at 1329; Guinchard and Buisson,
above n. 8, at 1357.
82. As was the case, for example, in CRR 25 October 2018,
ECLI:FR:CCASS:2018:C1E1087.
of the ‘commission d’instruction’, etc. In general, the
Act of 2014 could count on the approval of many
experts.83 However, they also identified several aspects
that were still unclear or possibly problematic.
In 2015 a doctoral thesis was finished that included an
analysis of the revision procedure of 2014.84 It identifies
several improvements, such as the enlargement of the
list of possible applicants, the possibility to seek
investigative measures before filing a request for revi-
sion and the clarification of the investigative powers of
the ‘commission d’instruction’ and the ‘formation de
jugement’.85 However, although it indicates that it was
too early to draw conclusions, it fears that the Act of
2014 cannot live up to the expectations the legislature
raised.86
The author regrets that the new provision on the
destruction or transfer of evidence, which requires the
public prosecutor and the attorney general to first notify
the convicted person, who can then oppose that decision
(see supra), applies only to criminal cases.87 Most
requests for revision concern ‘délits’,88 while to those
cases, this provision does not apply, so the possible dif-
ficulties for revision caused by the destruction of evid-
ence remain.89 Moreover, a prolongation of the term in
which evidence is stored is only useful and will only
enhance people’s confidence in the justice system if the
storage is done in the right circumstances (for example
moisture-proof and secured), which requires the
authorities to invest in the courthouses or other places
used for storage.90
With the Act of 2014, the legislature wanted to clearly
define the tasks of and differ between the ‘commission
d’instruction’ and the ‘formation de jugement’. It wan-
ted to ensure that the commission would only examine
the admissibility of the request and would not assess the
impact of the invoked fact or element on the question of
guilt (see supra).The commission thus has to examine
whether the fact is indeed new and the element was
indeed unknown by the court at the time of the initial
proceedings.91 However, it also has to examine its solidi-
ty and relevance.92 The boundary between examining
the solidity and relevance, on the one hand, and assess-
ing the impact on the convicted person’s guilt is not that
clear-cut and might tempt the commission to have a
look at the implications of the invoked fact or element
already, as was the case under the former revision
procedure.93
83. Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n. 15, at 8; Goetz, above n. 19,
at 251.
84. Goetz, above n. 19.
85. Ibid., at 226 and 251.
86. Ibid., at 251 and 317.
87. Ibid., at 278-84.
88. See, for example, Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2016, at 397 and
Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2017, at 347.
89. Goetz, above n. 19, at 278-84.
90. Ibid., at 284-5.
91. Ibid., at 254.
92. Ibid., at 255.
93. Ibid., at 255-6.
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The legislature wanted to broaden the scope of the
remaining ground for revision, by urging judges to no
longer require ‘serious doubt’ (see supra). This aspect of
the reform is decisive for the actual improvement of the
accessibility of the revision procedure, since it deter-
mines its scope.94 However, although the wording of the
ground for revision was changed, it still mentions
‘doubt’, as did the former provision.95 In 1989, when the
former provision was introduced, the legislature already
intended for doubt in itself to be sufficient. However,
despite that clear intention of the legislature, judges in
their case law interpreted it as requiring ‘serious doubt’.
The author thus questions whether, after the Act of
2014, judges will adjust their case law.96 Since requests
for revision concern final decisions and due to the
authority of res iudicata, judges might still be reluctant
to find that there is doubt.97 For those and for other
reasons,98 the author fears that the Act of 2014 is not as
large a reform as it claims to be.99
The ‘Assemblée nationale’ requested an evaluation of
the Act of 2014. Several parties involved in the revision
procedure were heard, and the report was presented to
the ‘Assemblée nationale’ in December 2016.100 In gen-
eral, the reform has been positively received.101 The
members of the CRR find that its composition, which
now includes members of the different chambers of the
‘Cour de cassation’, is an enrichment for its delibera-
tions.102 The Act of 2014 also more clearly embeds the
rights of the parties involved, such as the possibility for
a contradictory debate, access to the case file, legal
assistance and the possibility to seek investigative meas-
ures before filing a request,103 and enlarges the list of
possible applicants. Both developments are also warmly
welcomed.104
However, the report also identifies some shortcomings
and makes suggestions for possible amendments,
although it immediately stresses that it is still too early
to draw clear conclusions. A first suggestion is that in
94. Ibid., at 232.
95. Ibid., at 290.
96. Ibid., at 235. As question Angevin a.o., above n. 17, at n. 57-58.
97. Goetz, above n. 19, at 235 and 292-5.
98. In this article, we discussed only some of the criticisms voiced in the
doctoral thesis. The author also suggests amendments on, among other
aspects, the inclusion in the ground for revision of elements that were
already present in the case file but not discussed in the initial proceed-
ings, the composition of the ‘commission d’instruction’, which currently
does not necessarily include (former) investigating judges, and the posi-
tion of the victim in the procedure for revision and in the procedure to
suspend the execution of the conviction while the request for revision is
being examined (Goetz, above n. 19, at 240-3, 275-7 and 311-14).
99. Goetz, above n. 19, at 317.
100. Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n. 15.
101. Ibid., at 8.
102. Ibid., at 9.
103. Although this novelty from the Act of 2014 was welcomed as a guaran-
tee that convicted persons with a sincere claim but insufficient resources
would have access to the revision procedure too, and thus as an
improvement of the rights of the applicant, the first findings are that
applicants make little use of this possibility. However, experts believe
that it is only a matter of time until convicted persons learn of this pos-
sibility and will use it. (Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n. 15, at
20-1; Cormier, above n. 66, at n. 27.)
104. Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n. 15, at 11-12, 15 and 20-1.
order to fully reinforce the rights of the parties, the revi-
sion procedure should contain a clear obligation for the
CRR to motivate105 its decisions.106 Another suggestion
is to amend the provision on the possibility to seek
investigative measures before filing a request so that the
term in which the public prosecutor has to respond (two
months) is one time renewable, the investigative meas-
ures have to be performed within a reasonable term and
the applicant is informed of the performed measures by
the public prosecutor in writing. In case the public pros-
ecutor is inactive, the applicant would then be able to
appeal to the attorney general.107 The report also con-
tains an amendment on the public prosecutor’s office
that performs the requested investigative measures, and
it suggests that the convicted person’s lawyer be notified
of the public prosecutor’s or attorney general’s intention
to destroy or transfer evidence.108 Finally, the report
also suggests the addition of a new ground for revision:
the existence of a fundamental procedural irregularity
affecting the reliability of evidence (see supra).109 An
example is confessions obtained by torture.
One of the parties that was heard in the evaluation sig-
nals that the CRR still seems to require ‘serious doubt’
before finding a request for revision founded.110 How-
ever, the report immediately adds the reservation that it
is too early and that there is not enough data available to
assess whether the case law has evolved or not.111
3.2 Current State of Affairs112
The doctoral thesis expects the ‘commission d’instruc-
tion’ to still involve the implications of the invoked fact
or element for the question of guilt when examining the
admissibility of a request for revision.113 Unfortunately,
there is little case law to turn to in order to verify this
expectation, since up to now only a few decisions of the
CRR have been published. However, the decision of the
commission of 14 December 2015114 seems to indicate
that the author of the doctoral thesis might be right.
Although it states that
Attendu qu’il résulte des articles 622, 624 et 624-2 du
code de procédure pénale que, s’il n’appartient qu’à
la formation de jugement de la Cour de révision et de
réexamen de déterminer si le fait nouveau ou l’élé-
ment inconnu de la juridiction au jour du jugement
est de nature à établir l’innocence du condamné ou à
faire naître un doute sur sa culpabilité, il incombe à la
105. The CPP already seems to contain this obligation in Art. 624-3 (see
supra footnote 64).
106. Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n. 15, at 12.
107. Ibid., at 20-2.
108. Ibid., at 22 and 24.
109. Ibid., at 17-18.
110. Ibid., at 15-16.
111. Ibid., at 16.
112. Unfortunately, we have been unable to obtain sufficient decisions of
the ‘commission d’instruction’ and the ‘formation de jugement’ to make
clear statements on the interpretation of the provisions on the revision
procedure by the CRR. The conclusions in this paragraph are therefore
cautious.
113. Goetz, above n. 19, at 255-6. As do Angevin a.o., above n. 17, at 149.
114. CRR (Commission d’instruction) 14 December 2015, 15REV040.
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commission d’instruction de se prononcer sur la rece-
vabilité de la demande de révision en appréciant,
notamment, la réalité du fait nouveau ou de l’élément
inconnu allégué par le demandeur, et son rapport
avec la question de la culpabilité; (…)115
it also contains the following considerations:
Attendu qu’aucune des pièces produites à l’appui de
la demande n’est de nature à remettre en cause les
témoignages ou le contenu des rapports figurant au
dossier de la procédure, lesquels font ressortir l’exis-
tence d’une rébellion commise contre la force armée
par au moins huit militaires armés; (…)116
and
Attendu que la participation personnelle d’Antoine X
… à ces actes de rébellion, ses refus d’obéissance et
ses outrages ont été retenus à partir des témoignages
de l’aspirant Y …, du capitaine K …, du lieutenant
Jules Z … et de l’adjudant L …, recueillis par l’offi-
cier de police judiciaire chargé de l’information, les
trois premiers témoins ayant, en outre, été entendus
par le tribunal militaire permanent; que la commis-
sion d’instruction, qui n’a pas à se prononcer sur la
suffisance de ces témoignages, ne peut que constater
qu’aucune des pièces produites à l’appui de la
demande en révision n’est de nature à les remettre en
cause; (…)117
In these considerations, the commission seems to go
beyond its task of examining whether the invoked facts
or elements exist, are indeed new or unknown and are
linked to the question of guilt. It already seems to make
an assessment of their impact on the convicted person’s
guilt, of whether they can raise doubt, by verifying
whether the facts or elements call into question the wit-
115. Own translation: ‘Whereas it follows from Arts. 622, 624 and 624-2
CPP that it is only for the ‘formation de jugement’ of the CRR to deter-
mine whether the new fact or element unknown to the court at the
time of the initial proceedings is of such a nature as to establish the
convicted person’s innocence or to give rise to doubt about his guilt, it
is for the ‘commission d’instruction’ to rule on the admissibility of the
request for revision by assessing the existence of the new fact or
unknown element that is put forward by the applicant, and its relation
with the question of guilt.’ CRR (Commission d’instruction) 14 Decem-
ber 2015, 15REV040.
116. Own translation: ‘Given that none of the pieces brought forward to
support the request are of such a nature as to call into question the tes-
timonies or the content of the reports in the file of the proceedings,
which bring to light the existence of a rebellion against the armed force
by at least eight armed soldiers; (…)’ CRR (Commission d’instruction)
14 December 2015, 15REV040.
117. Own translation: ‘Given that the personal involvement of Antoine X …
in the acts of rebellion, his refusal to obey and his insults are deduced
from the testimonies of aspirant Y …, of captain K …, of lieutenant
Jules Z … and of adjutant L …, collected by the judicial police officer
charged with the investigation, the first three witnesses, in addition,
having been heard by the permanent military tribunal; that the ‘com-
mission d’instruction’, who is not to decide on the conclusiveness of
these testimonies, can only come to the conclusion that none of the
pieces brought forward to support the request are of such a nature as
to call them into question; (…)’ CRR (Commission d’instruction) 14
December 2015, 15REV040.
ness statements that were gathered in the initial pro-
ceedings. However, one decision is insufficient to draw
conclusions from.
Both the author of the doctoral thesis and an expert
heard by the ‘Assemblée nationale’ fear that judges will
still require ‘serious doubt’ and that, because of this, the
accessibility of the revision procedure will not really
improve, by lack of accessibility on a substantive lev-
el.118 There is, unfortunately, currently too little case
law publicly accessible to make statements in this article
on how the judges of the CRR interpret the question of
doubt. By contrast, it is possible to draw some – albeit
cautious – conclusions on the accessibility of the revi-
sion procedure, based on the initial findings in the
report of the ‘Assemblée nationale’119 and on the figures
in the annual reports of the ‘Cour de cassation’,
available on its website120.
The report of the ‘Assemblée nationale’ finds that in
2015 the number of requests for revision had increased.
Moreover, the number of requests referred by the com-
mission to the formation had also grown.121 This is con-
firmed in the annual report of the ‘Cour de cassation’ of
2015.122 The commission deemed 145 requests for revi-
sion inadmissible (including the decisions by the presi-
dent of the commission) and referred eight requests to
the formation. In that same year, the formation decided
on seven requests and nullified one conviction.123
The annual reports of the ‘Cour de cassation’ contain
information up to the year 2019 (see infra Figure 1
‘Decisions of inadmissibility’ and Figure 2 ‘Number of
referrals and nullifications’). In 2016, there was again an
increase in the number of requests. One hundred and
thirty were considered inadmissible by the commission
or its president, and two were referred to the formation.
The formation decided on thirteen requests for revision
and nullified the original conviction in two cases.124 In
2017, the commission or its president found 139
requests inadmissible and referred seven requests to the
formation. In that same year, the formation rendered no
decision.125 The next year, in 2018, there was again an
increase in the number of requests. 118 requests were
found inadmissible, either by the commission or by its
president. Five requests were referred to the formation,
which decided on eight requests for revision that year
and nullified four convictions.126 The most recent fig-
ures of 2019 show again an increase in the number of
requests. One hundred and thirty-eight requests were
deemed inadmissible by the commission or its president,
and four requests were referred to the formation. The
118. Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n. 15, at 15-16; Goetz, above n.
19, at 235.
119. Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n. 15, at 13.
120. Which is www.courdecassation.fr/publications_26/rapport_annuel_36/.
121. Rapport d’information n° 4302, above n. 15, at 13.
122. Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2015, at 328-30.
123. Ibid.
124. Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2016, at 397-8.
125. Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2017, at 347-8.
126. Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2018, at 301-2.
30
ELR 2020 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000176
formation decided on seven requests for revision and
nullified four convictions.127
The figures on the period before the Act of 2014, from
1989 until 2013, show that, in this period, 3,358
requests were sent to the ‘commission de révision’,
which took 3,171 decisions and referred eighty-four
requests to the ‘Cour de révision’. In that same period
the ‘Cour de révision’ decided on eighty-four requests
and nullified fifty-one decisions.128 Compared with the
aforesaid more recent figures from the annual reports,
there seems to be a slight augmentation in the number
of cases referred by the commission to the formation.
Nevertheless, the commission still finds the majority of
requests inadmissible, mainly because of the absence of
a new fact or unknown element:
Ces irrecevabilités sont le plus souvent motivées par
l’absence de fait nouveau ou d’élément inconnu de la
juridiction de jugement au jour du procès.129
The overall success rate of requests for revision, how-
ever, has not improved significantly, although there
seems to be a slight improvement in the last two years.
Unfortunately, not enough case law has been published
yet to thoroughly examine whether those findings are
linked to the way in which the commission and the for-
mation perceive the division of tasks between them and
127. Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2019, at 270-1.
128. Rapport d’information n° 1598, above n. 2, at 15.
129. Own translation: ‘These inadmissibilities are mostly motivated by the
absence of a new fact or element that was unknown to the court at the
time of the initial proceedings.’ Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2016,
at 397. Also see Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2015, at 329; Rap-
port annuel Cour de cassation 2017, at 347; Rapport annuel Cour de
cassation 2018, at 301; Rapport annuel Cour de cassation 2019, at 270.
interpret the question of doubt, as still requiring ‘seri-
ous doubt’ or not.
4 Conclusion
The Act of 2014 reformed the revision procedure. Many
aspects of the procedure were changed for the better,
such as the enlargement of the list of possible applicants,
the possibility to seek investigative measures before fil-
ing a request for revision, the new provision on the stor-
age of evidence and the reinforcement of the rights of
the applicant.
For other changes, however, it is still unclear whether
they are successful. The legislature intended to clearly
define the different tasks of the ‘commission d’instruc-
tion’, on the one hand, and the ‘formation de jugement’,
on the other. The commission would have to examine
only the admissibility of the requests for revision, while
the formation would decide on the substance of the
requests. It would thus be the task of the formation only
to assess the impact of the invoked fact or element on
the convicted person’s guilt. Some experts, however,
question whether it is possible for the commission to
merely examine the existence, the new or unknown
character and the solidity and relevance of the invoked
fact or element without involving the implications of
that fact or element for the question of guilt.
Moreover, the legislature wanted to broaden the single
remaining ground for revision. It intended the slightest
doubt to be sufficient to obtain a new examination of the
merits of the case, but, after finding that it was artificial
to qualify doubt, decided to maintain the wording
‘doute’ and not replace it by ‘moindre doute’. However,
the legislature expressed its confidence in the judiciary
not to interpret the provision contrary to the intention
of the legislature and thus to no longer require ‘serious
Figure 1 Decisions of inadmissibility
Figure 2 Number of referrals and nullifications
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doubt’. Yet experts question whether stating that inten-
tion explicitly in the parliamentary debate is sufficient
to urge judges to change their interpretation. History
has shown that, owing to a strong commitment to the
authority of res iudicata, they are rather reluctant to find
that there is doubt, despite the clear intention of the leg-
islature not to require ‘serious doubt’.
In the introduction we posed the question whether the
Act of 2014 lives up to the expectations raised by the
legislature. The proclaimed aim of this reform was to
improve the accessibility of the revision procedure both
on a procedural and on a substantive level. Practice will
have to show whether it succeeded. On the basis of the
first findings, however, there seems to be no significant
augmentation in the success rate of requests for revision
in the period from 2015 until 2019, although the com-
mission seems to refer more cases to the formation.
Unfortunately, there is currently still too little case law
published to verify whether these findings are linked to
the way in which the commission and the formation
perceive their different tasks and to the interpretation of
the ground for revision. Not enough case law is publicly
available to assess whether the ground has indeed broad-
ened.
32
ELR 2020 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000176
